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CONFUCIAN LEADERSHIP DEMOCRACY:
A ROADMAP
YUTANG JIN

ABSTRACT: What kind of polity is justified by classic Confucian values? Adopting an
interpretive approach, this paper explores the idea of leadership democracy being expressive
of classic Confucian values by first introducing the models of leadership democracy associated
with Weber and Schumpeter and second connecting Confucian elitist values to them. I argue
that leadership democracy best realizes the Confucian emphasis on the people as the source of
legitimacy and the ruler as the engine of good governance. The Confucian idea of peoplerootedness is borne out by citizens behaving as democratic plebeians who are empowered to
choose their leader but devoid of moral and intellectual capabilities for collective decisionmaking. The Confucian idea of rulership is expressed by democratic leaders displaying
competent statesmanship and compensating for intra-elite tensions within the Confucian
tradition.
Keywords: Confucian democracy, leadership democracy, Confucian political theory, Max
Weber, Joseph Schumpeter

1. INTRODUCTION
Debates on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy have gone a long
way from examining their compatibility to exploring various ways in which Confucian
democracy can be justified and the particular shape it takes following its justification
(Ames and Hall 1999; Angle 2012; Chan 2013; Kim 2018; Tan 2003). For many
theorists today, Confucian democracy is no longer an oxymoron that defies the
possibility of a happy union between two markedly different traditions (Huntington
1993; Levenson 1966). Instead, democracy gradually comes to assume a central place
in scholastic discussion as “the only game in town”. This trend, however, is widely
contested by a constellation of scholars broadly identified as Confucian meritocrats.
Their preoccupation is largely with reviving and making sense of meritocratic strands
in Confucianism in ways that meet the challenges posed by the hegemony of liberal
democracy (Bai 2008; Bai 2019; Bell 2009; Bell 2016; Jiang 2013; Kang 2005).
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For many, normative proposals start with the philosophical reconstruction of
Confucianism. Often availing themselves of multiple sources from different
philosophical traditions (mostly Confucian and Western, both broadly construed), they
participate in “a reflective project in cross-tradition engagement that has its focus on
most-relevant aspects of the target texts from different traditions to a jointly concerned
issue under examination” (Mou 2020, 140) where the jointly concerned issue is
normative theories of democracy and meritocracy. In philosophical reconstruction, the
“other” elements from different traditions that are “external” to each other have now
become “internal” contributing parts that are necessary to reconstructed Confucian
theories. Without delegitimizing the value of their intellectual pursuit, this article
embarks on a related but different inquiry querying the scope of interpretation, which
is a crucial issue largely glossed over by contemporary Confucians. An interpretive
question typically asks what kind of Confucian polity is conceptually possible within
the pedigree of Confucian thought—that is, whether Confucian thought justifies
meritocracy or democracy and what kind of meritocracy or democracy follows such a
justification. Philosophical interpretation and reconstruction are not exclusive of one
another—they are simply different matrixes according to which an account can be
evaluated independent of the author’s intention.1
Interpretation here is not the same as seeking to “approximate the perspectives of
past thinkers whose ideas are recorded in past texts”; rather, it closely resembles the
“preliminary-engagement” phase of what Bo Mou (2020, 142) calls the “synchronicmultiple-dimension model” in cross-tradition engagement. In other words, my work
seeks to understand and articulate Confucian standpoints in relation to the substantial
issue of democracy, which does not refrain from deploying concepts and resources
external to traditional Confucianism to capture and articulate various meanings of the
Confucian text. But my approach nevertheless differs from Mou’s model in two aspects:
first, the interpretation I propose pursues not so much a comprehensive goal of crosstradition engagement but an understanding of the Confucian outlook as an end-in-itself.
Second, the disciplinary pedigree both enacted and constrained by a particular tradition
(in my case, Confucianism) is as important as the substantial issue under examination
(the idea of democracy). In this sense, my interpretation pertains to the method of what
Stephen Angle (2012, 9) calls “rooted global philosophy”.
Why should we attend to the issue of interpretation in addition to philosophical
reconstruction and normative configuration? Briefly, the scope of interpretation merits
particular attention for two reasons. First, the way Confucian sources are invoked is an
inquiry valuable for its own sake. It is worth asking, in line with the Confucian tradition,
what the spirit of Confucianism is (Chan 2013, 5-17) and how the Way it displays (daotong 道 統 ) (Makeham 2003) impacts on contemporary politics. For instance, in
addition to asking what form of citizenship is normatively plausible and how different
1

For instance, the fact that some Confucian democrats intend to reconstruct Confucian philosophy by
blending it with Western democratic values in pursuit of some synthesis does not preclude them from
being evaluated from an interpretive perspective. Alternatively, a work solely focusing on interpretation
can also be judged in terms of value from the perspective of reconstruction.
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sources, Confucian or not, can be amalgamated to support democratic citizenship, we
may also ask what kind of citizenship the stretch of Confucian sources can support.
Second, interpretation is an enduring tradition within which generations of Confucians
have gone about their intellectual inquiry. Late Qing Confucians, Japanese Confucians
in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras as well as twentieth century New Confucians
in Hong Kong and Taiwan have all been concerned with, not only to what extentmodern
values are plausible in their own right, but whether and how Confucian values support
political modernity especially democracy (Paramore, 2016; Tseng, 2020). 2 Does
embracing modern values mean that we should dispense with the Confucian tradition?
If not, how is it possible for one to forsake part of the tradition and still faithfully claim
one’s modern account as Confucian? Shunning the practice of interpretation, therefore,
risks dismissing massive intellectual exercises that attempt to grasp the complex
relationship between Confucianism and democracy.
That said, there are broadly three ways in which one can register a stance on the
issue of interpretation. First, an interpreter can claim that her interpretation (whether
meritocratic, democratic or hybrid) is the only faithful reading of the Confucian
tradition. Second, a weaker claim is that one’s interpretation is the best or the most
faithful reading of Confucianism though there are many legitimate ways in which it can
be read and interpreted. Finally, an even weaker position than the second one is that
one’s interpretation is one among many possible interpretations of Confucianism, each
of them palatable in different contexts. The last stance verges on seeking compatibility
between Confucianism and democracy by reinterpreting some Confucian texts and is
most accommodative in terms of its interpretive strategy.
In light of the three stances above, the core argument I make in this article—that
core ideas of classic Confucianism, which I recast as plebeian and elitist values, are
delivered in what I call “Confucian leadership democracy” (henceforth CLD)—can be
read in two ways depending on the context in which one situates my work. First, this
article can be seen as pertaining to the second claim and proposing the most promising
reading of Confucian texts within the legitimate boundary of interpretation. Some
recent studies (Jin 2020), by focusing on Confucian meritocracy and participatory
Confucian democracy, show that both of them overuse one aspect (either elitist or
plebeian) of Confucian democracy while leaving other elements in limbo. Jin briefly
sketched a realist Confucian democracy that combines democratic election with strong
leadership, of which CLD is one variant, as the most plausible approach to
understanding Confucian ethico-political demands. In this context, this work builds on,
and extends, this account. Alternatively, one may understand my current piece as fitting
into the third, “compatibility” category as it is also a standalone work that explores the
overlapping area between Confucianism and democracy without assuming the
2

It should nevertheless be noted that not all commentators agree that New Confucians worked within
the interpretive canon. Angle and David Elstein 2012 tend to understand Mou Zongsan as offering
Confucian reasoning for democracy (thus falling within the interpretive category), while Thomas
Fröhlich 2017 views Tang Junyi, a contemporary of Mou, as advocating for civil-theological modern
Confucianism that bypasses existing forms of Confucianism.
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interpretive superiority of CLD over previous views. Seen in this light, my work
proposes an original way of rendering Confucianism and democracy compatible
without attempting to demolish its contenders.
With a conceptual setup in hand, we can proceed with our discussion. In the rest of
the article, I first argue, by invoking Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, that
leadership democracy is not a way of life offering tantalizing promises of participatory
rights and collective decision-making but a cluster of institutions that hold the elite
leader to account by providing them with incentives to compete for popular vote.
Second, I discuss the sense in which Confucian plebeian values are borne out by
citizens behaving as democratic citizens empowered to choose their leader but devoid
of moral and intellectual virtues for collective decision-making. Finally, as a parallel
case, I recast Confucian rulers as democratic leaders in leadership democracy by
exploring their resemblances and how democratic leadership can deliver on Confucian
elitist values.
2. LEADERSHIP DEMOCRACY: WEBER AND SCHUMPETER
Before we examine the close relationship between Confucian values and leadership
democracy, it is worth briefly clarifying what the latter denotes. The leadership or
competitive model of democracy 3 as we know it today is often associated with
Schumpeter. Its nascent form, however, can be traced back to Weber whose influence
on Schumpeter was enormous (Osterhammel 1987). Weber’s and Schumpeter’s views
on democracy are, first and foremost, responses to their respective social and political
contexts (Eliaeson 1998; Medearis 1997, 820). For Weber (1978, 975), leadership
democracy is largely a recipe for addressing problems associated with the hegemony
of modern social and political forces, especially that of state bureaucratization in the
age of modernity as an iron-cage. Schumpeter’s concern, as noted above, is over “the
classic doctrine of democracy”, which is an uneasy blender of post-Enlightenment,
utilitarian and Rousseauian elements (Held 2006, 149-150; Plamenatz 1973, 96-99).
Despite their different concerns, the forms of democracy that they delineate are
strikingly similar and I will focus on what they share in common as a starting point.
Weber’s “plebiscitarian leadership democracy” is a political mechanism by which the
people exercise control over politicians and competent leaders are selected (Weber,
1994, 339). The Schumpeterian model of democracy also puts at the center a dynamic
interaction between leaders and the electorate, which refers to “that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2010,
269).
The primary feature of leadership democracy is the lopsided relationship between
the powerful political elite and democratic citizens deficient in capacities needed for
coping with complex governance issues. Democracy for Weber (1978, 985) is not the
3

Weberian and Schumpeterian types of leadership democracy are by no means identical. My emphasis
is on the common ground of elitist democracy shared by Weber and Schumpeter.
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“greatest possible rule of the demos but the party leaders of the demos” because the
“shapeless mass” never govern themselves or large associations. Weber (1994, 326)
likens the political structure of representative democracy to a firm controlled by
shareholders’ meeting in which it is not shareholders, but “the board of trustees” that
wields real influence and makes important decisions on whom to recruit for
management. It is therefore natural that the leader of the Caesarist type grows out of
democracy whose efficiency “depends on the position of the Caesar as a free trustee of
the masses who is unfettered by tradition” (Weber 1978, 961). Schumpeter goes further
than Weber in attacking a particular way of understanding democracy as a political
exercise by which the popular will directly translates into policy and law (Miller 1983).
Schumpeter (2010, 254) argues that there is no such thing as the “popular will,” and
even if we take the majority preference as the popular will, it may turn out that “nondemocratic agencies may be more acceptable to the people than democratic bodies”.4
A democratic leader is interested not so much in popular demand directly as in
amassing popular vote for election success the same way suppliers in the market are
mainly driven by economic benefits, not by satisfying consumer desires directly (Miller
1983, 134).
For both Weber and Schumpeter, political leaders are, as they should be, trained in
political struggles for power. The training and formation of responsible political
leadership requires as necessary conditions partisanship and parliament—especially a
parliament that does not practice “negative politics” but is endowed with real functional
power. For Weber (1994, 339, 351) “the creation of party machines…means the advent
of plebiscitarian democracy”, and “the only choice lies between a leadership
democracy with a ‘machine’ and democracy without a leader, which means rule by the
professional politician who has no vocation, the type of man who lacks precisely those
inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader”. By the same token, “The purpose of
parliamentarization” is “to turn parliament into a place where leaders can be selected
or train politicians who can assume leadership posts” (Weber 1994, 251). Schumpeter
(2010, 246) explicitly suggests replacing the notion of “government by the people”
with that of “government approved by the people”. What results is a reversal of the
sequence by which “the deciding of issues by the electorate” is made “secondary to the
election of the men who are to do the deciding” (Schumpeter 2010, 269; emphasis
added). The particular merit of Schumpeter’s model is his emphasis on elite
competition for votes, which differs from the notion of representation which carries its
own paradoxes (Pitkin 1967). As Ian Shapiro (2009, 58) accurately points out, the
drastic move made by Schumpeter is from the language of representation to that of
consumer sovereignty. Here Schumpeter goes further than Weber in focusing on the
competitive nature of leadership democracy, which not only offers an accurate
depiction of the way democracy works in reality, but also brings forward the vital role

4

One of distinctive contributions of Schumpeter lies in his rejection of the classic doctrine of the popular
will. See the symposium on Schumpeter in Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society (2017)
29:4.
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of political leadership, which he takes to be neglected by many democratic theorists of
his day.
For both Weber and Schumpeter, a plausible account of democracy does not give
effect to the idea of self-legislation by which the people exercise collective self-rule.
From Weber and Schumpeter, we can then retrieve a realist version of democracy in
which the political elite are motivated to seek “public acclamation” through
competitive election. Leadership democracy gives more weight to the democratically
elected leader than it does to the electorate in shaping the political agenda. Despite
challenges on many fronts, this basic model still offers a sense of “historical
felicity”(Dunn 2014, 2) and empirically delivers on democratic promises around the
globe (Przeworski 2010). One caveat here is that CLD does not need to accept all
features and premises of leadership democracy as associated with Weber and
Schumpeter; rather, its basic structures of election and leadership serve as a point of
reference for my interpretation of Confucian values.
How does this leadership model of democracy then relate to Confucian values?
Given that the issue at stake revolves around the nexus between elite and people and
CLD depends for its intelligibility on how this nexus is conceived, I shall discuss
Confucian notions of the people and leaders and how they relate to the leadership model.
My primary purpose in the following discussion is to demonstrate the way in which the
telos of classic Confucian thought requires the leadership model of democracy.
3. THE PEOPLE AS DEMOCRATIC PLEBEIANS
In classic Confucian texts,5 the most frequent terms of reference for the people are min
(民), zhong (眾), and bai-xing (百姓), among others. Pinning down the normative
weight of the people in overarching Confucian ethical-political order, however, is a
complex matter. Often the image of the people and the role they play change
dramatically depending on the particular textual context and the prefix associated with
the people that implies moral judgement. Let me start with one of the most tantalizing
accounts of the people’s political role as legitimizing power transfer. In 5A5 and 5A6
of the Mencius, Mencius takes on Wanzhang, one of his disciples, in relation to issues
involved in power transfer. Wanzhang asks whether it is true that Sage-King Yao gave
power to another Sage-King Shun. Mencius replies that “the King cannot give the
empire to another” but can only “recommend” his successor to Heaven and seek a
Heavenly Mandate. Mencius continues, “Yao put Shun in charge of ritual sacrifices,
and the various spirits were pleased with him. This was Heaven accepting him. He put
Shun in charge of affairs, and the affairs were well-ordered, and the people were at
ease with him. This was the people accepting him” (Mencius 5A5, 5A6; emphasis
added). A similar justificatory pattern is offered following Shun’s abdication to Yu and
the succession of Yu by his son Qi.
5

By classic Confucianism, I primarily refer to the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xun-Zi, which
constitute the very core of the Confucian intellectual tradition. I will also touch on other texts including
the Book of Rituals where they can help to strengthen the case I make.
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The message conveyed by Mencius is that power transfer is legitimated by the
people being at ease or content (an 安) with the ruler in charge, in addition to the
requirement that no natural anomalies happen. These passages are joined by others that
justify rightful rebellions in terms of protecting the wellbeing of the people (Mencius
1B8, 7B4). For Mencius, “the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods
of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” (Mencius 7B14). For some theorists,
these anecdotes display democratic tendencies in Mencius given that the people are so
conceived as having an impact on the choice of the ruler (Cheng 1979; Tu 2002).
Commentators, however, disagree over whether the people, so conceptualized, are
active political agents sanctioning a mandate to govern or passive signs of political
legitimacy and whether they act on opting for the ruler themselves or should be guided
by distinguished feudal lords at the time of power transfer (Angle 2012, 37-41; El
Amine 2015, 37-51; Kim 2011; Nuyen 2013; Tiwald 2008).
The interpretive question can be put as follows: do Mencian ideas require
monarchical rule or actually support democracy and only reluctantly accommodate the
monarchy? If it is the latter, then the claim made by many New Confucians including
Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan that Confucianism requires democracy makes much
more sense than is usually assumed. Answering the interpretive question, however, is
not easy. As Chan (2013, 15) puts it, “it is unclear whether the Confucian idea of having
one Sage King to exercise supreme authority is necessarily a part of this ideal or merely
a product of adaptation to nonideal conditions.” Nevertheless, let’s set about addressing
this interpretive issue.
One of the obstacles that blocks a democratic reading is the lack of agency on the
people’s part in initiating and sustaining the legitimation process in the Mencius, which
can be further perceived from two aspects. First, whether it is peaceful royal
transmission between sage-kings or a tumultuous rebellion against the corrupt king,
there seems to be always a discrepancy between those who lead in acting on the process
(tian-li 天吏) and those with respect to whom the process is justified (the people)
(Tiwald 2008, 274-277; Kim 2011, 382; El Amine 2015, ch. 1). Second, the intensity
in terms of which the people are invoked varies depending on the mode of succession.
The people’s expression of contentment is required for non-hereditary succession while
heredity is justified so long as no popular revolt is discerned, which leads some to argue
that Mencius actually displays complicity in heredity (El Amine 2015, 40). If we
appropriate Sheldon Wolin’s distinction between politics and the political, we may
claim that the upgrading of the people’s role in Confucian power transfer features an
episodic, political “moment of commonality” while their agency is minimized in
everyday politics (Wolin 1994).
Why does Mencius accord supreme importance to the people while granting them
no active agency? I suggest a line of reading according to which it is not so much the
case that Mencius is naturally predisposed to confine the rights of rebellion and royal
endorsement to the elite few but that he encountered the problem of making sense of
the people’s voice when its contour is amorphous. For Mencius, feudal lords and agents
of Heaven are put in place, not for their own glory, but to give shape to the collective
voice of the people, which Mencius takes to be crucial to the legitimacy of Confucian
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political order. In other words, it is the concern over setting clear and undisputable
criteria for judging when and where there emerges a popular expression of contentment
(or lack thereof), that makes Mencius end up embracing an arrangement in which the
agents of Heaven interpret the people’s action.
The reason for this plebiscitary reading lies in the particular way in which Mencius
presents his case for popular expression. To illustrate, two contrasts between Mencius’s
account of what I incline to call “popular approval”, and the idea of popular sovereignty
as we find in the West, which is not necessarily tethered to democratic mechanisms,
may help. First, because of the need to justify the supreme authority of the modern state,
the modern idea of popular sovereignty, whether in Hobbes or Rousseau, presupposes
a “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority”, (Morris 2000, 7) a kind of
uniformity that requires a holistic notion of the people, which invites the problem of
making sense of the people’s voice. In contrast, Mencius’ language of supremacy is
mediated by the Heavenly Mandate, and the expression of contentment from the masses
does not carry such compelling gravity toward holism as is required in the idea of
popular sovereignty. For Mencius, the people being decisive therefore does not
necessarily imply their acting in unison, but allows for a cacophony of plebeian
people’s concerns. 6 Second, underlying many contractarian accounts of popular
sovereignty is also the idea of hypothetical consent, which “rested on what people
would agree to if they were rational” (Chambers 2004, 154) while, for Mencius, it is
not hypothetical scenarios but the people’s real feeling that is at stake. Confucian
politics puts emphasis on the people’s actual feelings not only because they confer
authority on rulership, which points to the people as the “conduit of the state’s
legitimacy” (Angle 2012, 39), but also because Confucian rulership, instead of
manipulating an artificial expression of the people, always builds their perfectionist
governance on respect for the people’s natural life including their sentiments and
expressions as valuable in itself (Xu 2013, 479-484).
Given that Mencius’s idea of popular approval distances itself from holistic and
hypothetical orientations associated with popular sovereignty, it is therefore not too
farfetched a claim that were there more tangible ways of giving effect to such an
expression, Mencius would have willingly done away with his original arrangement.
In line with existing readings (Chan 2007), my claim is not that Mencius did duck the
feudal lords along with their liabilities such that democracy as an institutional measure
is readily available in the Mencius. Nor is my claim simply that Mencius’s original
view should be altered in light of normative standards of modern times. Rather, my
stand here is that Mencius’s idea of popular approval would call for a more egalitarian
arrangement than the original one on offer should its own potential be fully unleashed.
Consequently, if we drop the temptation to associate Mencius with the popular will and
instead connect the “contentment of the people” to the sense in which the elite are made
6

Joseph Chan understands Mencius’s popular approval as consent, and he is correct that the popular
sovereignty grounded in consent is not the same as democracy. He, however, shows a misreading of
Mencius insofar as there is no indication that the people’s acceptance in Mencius should take a holistic
or consent-like form, which is typical of understandings of popular sovereignty in early modern England.
For Chan’s view, see Chan 2007.
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responsive to the people’s feelings, that is, if we measure popular feelings by appealing
to “formal institutions” (Chan 2007), we may find Mencius’s plebeian values better
preserved and accentuated in democracy than in non-democratic regimes.
The pathway to Confucian democracy can be reinforced by forsaking the idea of
falling back on the people as constitutive of emergency measures at the time of turmoil
and instead rendering democracy normal and regular. A compelling Confucian case
can be made for the mandate to rule to be constantly renewed rather than hover over
the ruled until the ruler becomes too corrupt. In classic texts, the people’s feelings only
matter explicitly at the extraordinary moments of political change and the weight of
their expressed feelings is diminished during peaceful, dynastic rule. As a result, the
hereditary king cannot be removed just by virtue of the fact that he fails to measure up
to the expectation of the people. The very source of the move from the extraordinary
to the ordinary can actually be reasonably extrapolated from classic Confucianism. The
idea of respect for the people manifests itself in the entries in the Mencius prescribing
that, when promoting the worthy, the ruler follows the voice of “all men in the capital”,
not just that of her close attendants and counsellors; and that “there is a way to win
their (the people’s) hearts; amass what they want for them; do not impose what they
dislike on them” (Mencius 4A9). The message is more straightforward in the Great
Learning (12) saying that “what the people like, (the ruler) likes; what the people hate,
(the ruler) hates”. A corollary of respect for the people is thus a “politics of inexertion”
(wuwei 無為) that cautions against the ruler’s trampling upon what the people want for
themselves and improves their moral discipline on that basis (Slingerland 2007; Xu
2016, 32-33). Delivering election-based democracy on a regular basis, therefore, can
provide objective conditions under which a ruler is always responsive to what the
people want—not doing so would be at the peril of forsaking his own office. Under
such conditions, the ruler is institutionally bound to follow what the people want for
themselves rather than free to interfere with their life at her whim.
While Mencius’s thought—or the Mencian spirit—is much more democratic than
we usually think, one hurdle is still stuck in the way that questions the rationale behind
the people’s action. So far, I have used such terms as “expressions” and “feelings” to
refer to the forms in which the psychological status of an, or the people’s contentment,
is given tangible shape. For some commentators, the passive, affective and perhaps
spontaneous form of political action on the part of the people means that the people are
only indicators of Heaven’s approval rather than active agents whose deliberation and
judgement count in deciding on state affairs. The first is equivalent to asking of voters
their opinions on whom they want in office while the second resembles sampling public
opinion to justify one’s own public work. The striking implication of this view is that
the people only passively respond to what the leader did in the past (Tiwald 2008, 279).
This line of argument is not so much about who is entitled to initiate political action,
which has been addressed above, but about what kind of political action is required for
acting on democratic participation. Indeed, if we look at the larger picture of classic
Confucianism, the Confucian masters took pains to emphasize the impotence of the
people in terms of both intelligence and virtue and why they can only be made to follow
(De Bary, 1996: 19-20). For Confucius, min are often depicted as the masses that need

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

JIN

88

to be tamed and educated (Analects 12.19). In the Mencius, the people’s role is
constantly likened to that of the petty person (xiao-ren 小人), the latter of which often
points to those despicable personalities captivated by trivial and ignominious motives
(Mencius 3A4, 6A14, 6A15). Similarly, Xun Zi ridicules “the virtue of min” as the
habit of blindly following customs, being drawn to pecuniary benefits and treasuring
prolongation of one’s life, which stands in contrast to that of the nobleman (jun-zi 君
子) (Xun-Zi, “Ru-Xiao”).
There are three aspects about Mencius’ understanding of the people’s political
capability that further demonstrate Mencius’s natural affinity with leadership
democracy rather than any of its alternatives. First, there is no compelling reason for
setting the threshold of meaningful participation so high as to crowd out many nonactive forms of participation that fall within the range of democracy. The people’s
ability to participate is, after all, only required to such a level as is possible for them as
democratic citizens to fulfil basic roles such as casting votes. Reciprocal deliberation
and active judgement may be prerequisites for deliberative and participatory forms of
democracy (cf. Gutmann and Thompson 1998, 52-94), but they are not necessary for
the leadership models of Weber and Schumpeter. A realistic expectation of mass
behavior is the aspect on which Weberian and Schumpeterian models and Confucian
values converge. Indeed, one of the merits of leadership democracy is that it
acknowledges that the people as the multitudes are incapable of governing themselves.
Leadership democracy only requires that the people be able to feel and respond to their
own interests and put in power whoever they believe is likely to act on their interests.
Similarly, the basic postulates about the people in classic Confucianism are also that
the people tend to be selfish, non-virtuous and intemperate, which is why they need to
be constantly taken care of by the ruler. Each individual of them, short of education
and commitment to ethical cultivation, is close to the petty person devoid of moral
standards. It is true that there is a nascent idea of moral equality (everyone can become
a Yao or Shun—both sage-kings) and educational equality (Confucius claimed that he
teaches everyone without any discrimination) in classic Confucianism (especially in
Mencius). However, first, equal moral potential or equal opportunities for education
can hardly be the same as actual equality, let alone a justification of democracy. Second,
it is also helpful to draw on Ames and Hall’s (1987, 139-141) distinction between min
as the collective masses often misguided by blindness and ignorance and ren as a
human being in the context of personal self-cultivation. In the end, min, short of actual
moral enlightenment, are able to express what they like and dislike (in terms of both
raw desires and moral sentiments), which stays at the heart of Confucian political order
and to which benevolent rulers should cater in order to legitimately stay in office
(Mencius 4A9, 5A5, 7A31; Xun-Zi, “Wang-Zhi”). The task of the virtuous ruler is then
to fulfil their basic needs and improve their moral wellbeing.7

7

There is a scholarly disagreement on the degree of moral improvement in classic Confucianism. For
Joseph Chan 2013 and Elton Chan 2019, for instance, Confucians are aimed at maximal moral
enhancement which is regrettably constrained by non-ideal conditions. For El Amine 2015 and 2019,
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Second, although there is a congruence between leadership democracy and
Confucian understandings of the people, one may further question whether the
epistemic limit of the people along with other psychosocial constraints applied to them
can prevent a democracy fulfilling tasks required of it. The challenge here is that
leadership democracy may distance itself from the Confucian understanding of the
people insofar as it is premised on functional public opinion of which Confucianism
falls short. For instance, Bentham famously used the metaphor of “public opinion
tribunal” (Bentham 1989, 76) to describe the way in which the people affect the official
decision-making of the elected representatives. Schmitt (2008, 257) also avowed that
“democracy is designed as the rule of public opinion”, but if the electorate are myopic
and ignorant—as classic Confucianism tends to assume—to such a level that they are
incapable of forming an opinion of their own except for the matters directly related to
their personal life, how can the public give effect to the mandate granted to the elite
ruler? Public opinion, after all, differs from the “popular will” simpliciter discussed
above in offering a rough contour of opinion constellations on matters of common
concern. In the political science scholarship of the recent decades, however, any
simplistic relationship of public opinion to policy matters is increasingly cast into doubt
not least because of such factors as elite manipulation, media bias, and the fact that the
public normally do not have opinions on matters beyond social and political saliency
(Jacobs & Shapiro 2002; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). As John Zaller’s study shows,
what matters for public opinion is the relative balance and overall amount of media
attention to contending political positions. Consequently, as he puts it, citizens “do not
have fixed opinion beforehand” but only “construct ‘opinion statements’ on the fly as
they confront each new issue” (Zaller 1992).
If pessimistic views of public opinion carry some plausibility, it follows that
functioning democracy does not necessarily presuppose informed public opinion,
which helps to affirm that Confucian assumptions about the people’s incompetence are
enough to justify democracy. After all, all that is required of the electorate is their
judging of the ruler’s ability to govern and responsiveness to the electorate’s personal
concerns by retrospective voting, which is close to what Confucian masters get to say
about the people’s political behavior. Leadership democracy, by separating off the
choice of the ruler from the collective choice of complex policies, gears itself up for
the conditions under which public opinion does not come across as valid contributions
from the public. This, in turn, sheds light on the distance between Schumpeterian
democracy upon which CLD is built and classic doctrines modelled upon public
opinion which provide some traces of Bentham and the two Mills, and of which
Schumpeter is deeply skeptical. Also, under such conditions, retrospective voting can
actually turn out to work remarkably well in the citizenry’s interest. As Manin (1997,
179) argues, rejection of the incumbent can be more efficient than election based on
the proposed policy as it is more certain from the electorate’s perspective that the
existing policy does not work to their benefit than that the promises made by the
however, common people are only expected to improve their moral status to such a level as is required
by hierarchical political order.
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competing political elites can be fulfilled once they assume office. Retrospective voting,
hence, can be as rational for citizens to opt for as any more in-depth deliberation and
prediction of the public policy, if they can ever come close to measuring up to the latter
undertaking.8
Finally, deep skepticism about the people’s capability also stems from their
reflection of something different from, if not entirely external to, their body natural.
The people, after all, speak on behalf of Heaven, who is invisible and reifies itself
through the “people’s eyes and ears” (Mencius 5A5). According to this view, it is not
the people themselves but Heaven that stands behind them, that is decisive, which
undermines the idea of the people per se being decisive in popular approval associated
with democracy. It is, however, not necessarily the case that the people speaking on
behalf of deities contradict the idea that the people are decisive. If we venture to the
early modern period of England when the modern idea of popular sovereignty was born
out of the crossfire between parliamentarians and royalists, we may find that popular
sovereignty loomed large ab initio not as the idea that the people speak for themselves,
but out of a political context in which the people are so conjectured as communicating
directly with, speaking on behalf of, the deity. Henry Parker, one of the earliest
spokespersons for the modern idea of popular sovereignty, argued that God, through
the people, chooses the hereditary kings as the ruler. The kings’ power is not absolute
but qualified by limitations set by fundamental laws and the people’s representatives
in Parliament. Should the limits be violated, the people through their representatives
have the power to revoke their trust in the king (Morgan 1989, 27-28). This narrative
looks strikingly similar to the story recounted by Mencius in which the feudal lords
speak and act on behalf of the people to remove the corrupt ruler at the behest of Heaven.
If the former case stands as a sufficiently intelligible variety of popular sovereignty,
there seems no reason why the second cannot support Mencius’s popular approval.
What matters here is not so much who, taken at face value, is in charge but how the
spiritual languages are manipulated in the service of popular approval.
4. CONFUCIAN RULERS AS DEMOCRATIC LEADERS
With reference to Mencius, I argued above that the plebeian value of Confucianism
calls for democracy while the monarchy along with its hierarchical structure is not what
Mencian thought genuinely requires. But how about the elitist value of Confucianism?
For Weber, it is inevitable, under the modern conditions of the industrialized mass
society, that the leader of the Caesarist ilk emerges from the democratic process whose
vocation lies in combatting the corrosive effects of self-serving bureaucrats and
delivering on political leadership that presides over incessant power struggles. In
8

Is there a tension between trusting people in choosing their ruler and being skeptical about their selfgovernance? I believe not. While examining rationales behind classic Confucians’ support of plebeian
values is beyond the scope of this article, we can reasonably postulate that the Confucians believe the
people can gauge a leader’s competence through a simple feeling of whether the leader delivers while
fulfilling the people’s demands is a colossal task required of the elite, so there is no inevitable tension.
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Schumpeterian democracy, the model of the elite being in charge remains largely
unchanged, which is complemented by crucial competitive mechanisms by which the
electorate as consumers choose from the politicians at loggerhead with each other
competing for votes. This, of course, does not mean that political leadership cannot
exist in more participatory democratic systems—after all, rhetoric and persuasion by
leaders had a high profile in the Athenian ekklesia. Athenian leaders, however, were
featured by their speaking and advisory functions and severely constrained by adult
citizens’ direct participation and collective decision-making from bodies largely
chosen by lot (Ober 2009, 107). What is remarkable in leadership democracy is thus a
large scope for political maneuvers reserved for the political elite who are
democratically elected and only accountable to the electorate on a periodic basis. How
does leadership democracy, then, best realize Confucian understandings of leadership?
Put differently, how is it possible that Confucian elitist values can be better delivered
in leadership democracy than in, say, meritocracy and participatory democracy?
Confucian political order is often allegorically characterized as a combination of
“inner sagehood” and “outer kinghood” that depicts the political sphere as a natural
flow from personal self-cultivation to family, state, and worldly affairs (Great Learning
1). At the center of this overarching ethical-political order resides the moral exemplar
firmly committed to both self-cultivation and ramification of moral values to her
surroundings, which constitute two sides of the same coin. It is no exaggeration to say
that leadership along with ideal personhood associated with it is the most important
factor in securing peace and delivering on the Confucian Way pivoted around such
values as benevolence and righteousness. For Confucian masters, the question of who
is in charge and the quality of order that one is able to deliver is inextricably interrelated.
Without the virtuous ruler in charge, there is no possibility that the vision of Confucian
politics can ever be brought into fruition. Says Confucius, “the rule of virtue can be
compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars
without leaving its place” (Analects 2.1) and also, “to govern is to correct. If you set an
example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect” (12.17)? There are also
ample anecdotes in the Mencius and the Xun-Zi directly associating the prevalence of
the Way with the virtue of the ruler, and abysmal failures in ruling with the ruler’s
moral debilitation (Mencius 1A5, 1A7, 1B8, 2A5, 7A13; Xun-Zi, “Wang-Zhi,” “JunDao,” “Qiang-Guo”). As Xun Zi’s metaphor tellingly illustrates, the ruler is to the
people as the headwater is to the river. Also, as William De Barry remarks, min
recurrent in classic texts which I discussed above often appear in conjunction with, and
recognition of, rulership (jun 君) and ideal personhood (jun-zi 君子) (De Bary 2004,
4-7).
The interpretive question vis-à-vis leadership is as follows: how does leadership
democracy preserve Confucian elitist values? The first way in which leadership
democracy can substantiate Confucian elitist values lies in its durability and pliability
in combining the ruler’s responsiveness to the people’s demand, with a large scope of
flexible action required by political leadership. For one thing, as I mentioned above in
discussing Confucian leadership styles, a Confucian ruler ought to practice the “politics
of inexertion” by which he commits himself to respecting what the people like and
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dislike for themselves, meaning that a ruler should refrain from imposing on the people
the values and policies at his whim. A leadership democratic structure can guarantee,
in institutional terms, that the ruler does not arbitrarily impinge upon the way ordinary
people go about their daily life insofar as the democratically elected leader’s power is
subject to the terms set by the regular mandate granted by the electorate. For another,
the overarching concern of the Confucian masters lies in delivering on good
governance by not only meeting the basic material needs of the people (Mencius 1A3,
1A5, 1A7, 2A5, 3A3) but also improving and sustaining their moral caliber (Mencius
1A3, 1A7, 3A3, 6B8, 7A14, 7A20). Some contemporary theorists have reformulated
Confucians’ concern over the qualities of political order as Confucian perfectionist
governance.9 In effect, the politics of inexertion, or wu-wei statecraft, already embodies
the idea of benevolent politics, which requires the ruler set upon themselves the task of
displaying an exemplary ethos and inspire the people towards the moral good
(Slingerland 2007, 144-147). As the Confucian masters relentlessly avow, the quality
and success of Confucian perfectionist governance rests on the moral disposition and
judgement of the ruler in charge, and much less on other factors such as law,
punishment and institutional mechanisms. In this light, leadership democracy, by
reserving a special sense of vocation for Confucian rulers who are now recast as
democratic leaders, can preserve much of the power traditionally wielded by the
Confucian rulers while circumscribing the extent to which this power is misused to the
detriment of Confucians’ plebeian concerns.
One of the reasons that leadership democracy can keep track of both plebeian and
elitist values in Confucianism remarkably well lies in the way a leader emerges from
political struggles in this model, which brings about the second aspect of its congruence
with Confucian elitist values, namely that the leader of an elite character inevitably
emerges from the democracy thus conceived. Indeed, an acute problem of which
Confucian meritocrats often charge their democratic counterparts is the dilution of elite
elements in Confucian political thought if we appeal to democratic electioneering.
Democracy is either depicted as the idea of collective decisions directly made by the
people or as a formal process by which political demagogues sway the electorate by
(illegitimately) promising benefits in return for putting them in office. Neither
depiction, however, squares with the idea of leadership democracy.
Among Confucian democrats, Joseph Chan 10 comes closest to my account by
identifying electoral democracy with the selection model—which he originally takes
from Jane Mansbridge (2009)—under ideal conditions. The basic idea is that
democratic elections can function as an efficient way in which responsible leaders are
selected (Chan 2013, 73-79). He promptly waters down the elitist flavor of his account,
however, by claiming that the selection model is not necessarily aristocratic but can, as
9

Pertinent examples are Joseph Chan’s moderate Confucian perfectionism and Sungmoon Kim’s public
reason Confucianism.
10
While some commentators prefer labelling Chan as meritocratic (see Kim 2018), Chan nevertheless
differs crucially from meritocrats such as Daniel A. Bell and Tongdong Bai in granting a decisive role
to the democratically elected body of legislation, and further in justifying democratic institutions in
Confucian terms, which is why I put him in the democracy group here.
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it should, accommodate the egalitarian idea of likeness—the idea that voters choose
leaders who resemble them—that structures political representation in contemporary
Western liberal democracies (Chan 2013, 79). The difficulty with his view is that he
assumes as problematic, rather than explains away, the realistic view of the vast
majority of the people as lacking virtues and political competence and a normative
vision that aspires to the aristocratically oriented elite being in charge. Consequently,
his strategy is dismissing the “old understanding” of the selection model as revolving
around “hierarchy and distinction” (Chan 2013, 78). While Chan believes that the idea
of likeness does not imply a mediocre representative with average abilities, he
nevertheless favors a democratically elected leader committed to cultivating likeness,
whatever elitist merit she possesses. As controversial is the implications of his retreat
into the idea of likeness, which blinds us to the crucial aspect on which Confucians’
relentless emphasis on elitist leadership and the aristocratic feature of electoral
democracy converge. Partly because of his lack of confidence in the elitist character of
democratic elections, Chan readily joins Confucian meritocrats in envisioning a
meritocratic chamber constitutive of non-electorally selected elites that stands
independent of the democratically elected chamber.11
In this light, the democratic part of Chan’s theory preserves elite power but is hardly
elitist in orientation. It is, however, no surprise that Chan is keen on severing
democratic elections from distinctive aristocratic tendencies. Evidently, election as an
aristocratic method of selecting leaders did not come to be associated with democracy
until the advent of modern representative democracy after the American and French
Revolutions. According to Manin, election manifests its elite characters in at least four
aspects: in the unequal treatment of candidates by voters according to the measures
widely accepted, in the necessity of the candidates having superior qualities in a certain
social and cultural settings, in the cognitive advantages granted by visual or charismatic
salience, and finally in the cost of information that is unequally distributed and which
is only affordable to someone at an social and political advantage (Manin 1997, 134148). In effect, the elite character of election was duly recognized by the Chinese as
early as late Qing when such figures as He Qi and Hu Liyuan advocated, in their joint
work known as the Truthful Demonstration of New Politics (Xin-Zheng-Zhen-Quan 新
政真詮), a unitary legislative body instead of the two-House system (He, 1994). They
believed that a House of Lords would be redundant because a lower House alone is
capable of promoting those intelligent and virtuous who are due to be recognized by all
as their representatives.
There may, however, be doubts about the affinities between Confucian and
Weberian (or Schumpeterian) leadership qualities. Weber (1994, 220) recognizes that
the Caesarist leader emerging out of political struggles would excel at demagoguery
swaying the voters by rhetoric and charisma. Manin (1997, 143) also argues that leaders
11

I am not against the idea of the second chamber, though. My reasoning for the second chamber, which
serves to preserve continuity and tradition, however, differs from both republicans’ account of separation
of powers and Confucian meritocrats’ account of elitist power. This article, however, is not the place to
expand on this idea.
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in representative democracy are only elite in appearance—instead of being truly noble,
they are only perceived by the public as possessing elite characters in certain social and
cultural settings. Admittedly, there are largely two aspects in which Confucian and
Caesarist leaders may part company. First, in leadership democracy, the stakes are high
in political struggles by which politicians engage in a complex process of persuasions
and negotiations. For Weber, in order for a leader not to be purely demagogic, it is
essential that she go through power struggles in partisan and parliamentary politics. In
contrast, the direct flow from ethical self-cultivation to one’s outer sphere of life in
Confucianism means that a Confucian elite does not need to excel at political gimmicks
in order to be able to lead. Instead, political and personal virtues are united in selfcultivation oriented towards moral goodness whether one is in office or not. When
asked why not participate in politics, Confucius replied that “the Book of History says,
‘Oh! Simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an
influence upon government.’ In so doing, a man is, in fact, taking part in government.
How can there be any question of his having actively to take part in government”
(Analects 2.21)?
What follows from the first aspect is a divergence in the virtues or capabilities
needed for a successful leader, which is the second aspect in which leadership
democracy prima facie defies Confucian leadership. For Weber (1994, 352), the
desirable qualities required of the leader, are a sense of passion about the beliefs for
which one fights, a sense of responsibility by which one weighs the consequences for
political action, and capabilities for shrewd judgement in changing circumstances.
Underlying these desiderata is an acute awareness of the danger and frailty built into
power relations in politics. For the Confucians, the cardinal virtues required in politics
are of an overwhelmingly humanitarian nature, which include, among others, the
virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. In other words, a
Confucian leader needs to be vigilant to human sufferings and roll out benevolent
policies to address them. Bell (2016, 60-61), for instance, picks up on the divergence
here by holding democracy of one-person-one-vote responsible for the disruption of
harmonious relationships constitutive of Confucian ethics. To borrow the market
analogy, the Confucian leader not only plays along as suppliers interested in gathering
votes but also directly attends to the fundamental wants and needs of ordinary people,
which is markedly different from power-hunting politicians.
In response, we may say, first, that the fact that the idea of CLD piggybacks on
leadership democracy does not mean that CLD needs to accept all features of its
prototype. Some aspects of leadership democracy, in its original form, indeed sit ill
with CLD. For instance, I do not deny Weber’s obsession with charisma and demagogy
which defies some Confucian leadership qualities; nor do I dismiss his understanding
of modern political parties as bureaucratically organized apparatus which requires
charismatic leadership to rein it in. Far from absorbing all theoretical premises of
Weber and Schumpeter, CLD attempts instead to remedy the aspects of its protype that
it finds problematic while keeping its conceptual intelligibility. Second, the gap
between the spirit of Confucianism and leadership democracy is not so wide as it
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appears. Rather, leadership democracy can help weather problems inherent in
traditional Confucian politics thereby restoring the spirit of Confucian elitism.
In terms of the extent to which leadership democracy conduces to Confucian elite
qualities, three aspects are particularly worth highlighting. First, despite their different
understandings of politics and merits required of political leaders, both leadership
democrats and Confucians would regard resilience and elasticity, astute judgment as
well as a commitment to serving public office, as particularly relevant to political
leadership. Second, leadership democrats’ attendance to power and the way it operates
between elite and people demonstrate not so much their cynicism about moral concerns
but their perspicacity in directly confronting and containing the dark side of politics.
Weber (1994, 369), who champions Caesarist democracy, emphasizes the importance
of combining passion with a willingness to cope with the consequences of one’s action,
the balance of which defines genuine vocational statesmanship. Third, as I noted in the
section on plebeian values, one distinctive feature of Confucian wu-wei politics is the
tremendous care that the ruler takes to cater to what the people actually want for
themselves. In this light, that the democratic system is so designed as to give incentives
for the elite to compete for popular votes does not prevent them cultivating broader
senses of statesmanship. Far from undermining the nourishment of virtues, we can say
that being attentive to popular demands and finding intelligent ways to address them is
an integral part of Confucian wu-wei politics.12
The reason that the Confucian spirit supports and justifies leadership democracy
can be further gleaned from the uneasy relationship between Confucian intellectuals
and the traditional monarchy that have long troubled Confucianism throughout East
Asian political history (De Bary 1996, 46-56). Traditionally, Confucian leadership was
comprised of enlightened rulership and ministership that was put up to rectify the
former’s drawbacks. When I mentioned Confucian leadership, I meant both, but far
from complementary, they were in constant tension. According to De Bary, what
bedeviled Confucians’ effort to bring about the benevolent Way is that Confucianism
put upon the nobleman or scholar-officials (shi-da-fu 士 大 夫 ) all burdens of
responsibility without giving valency to social forms and institutions. When despotism
arises and wreaks havoc on the society, Confucians readily take the blame because they
are supposed to break through the cant and the convention to give effect to the Way.
Accordingly, one of the strains that tends to pull apart Confucian moral integrity is the
issue of participation in politics (Eno 1990, 42-51). On the one hand, the protoparticipatory aspect of the Confucians can be found in the frequency with which moral
principles are discussed in relation to governance. On the other hand, rulers were
predominantly corrupt and egocentric and even Confucian masters struggled to find a
ruler appreciative of their visions (Pines 2009, ch. 6 & 7). While Confucius himself
was never for or against anything, he enjoined others to “show yourself when the Way
12

Electoral competition is not sufficient for fostering Confucian wu-wei politics. Hyperbolic
competitions in advanced democracies today acutely remind us of the need for further social ethos and
institutional arrangements that preserve and entrench Confucian virtue cultivation among the elite. More
on this in the conclusion.
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prevails in the Empire but hide yourself when it does not” (Analects 8.13). In a similar
vein, Mencius fleshed out his view by claiming that “a Gentleman never abandons
rightness in adversity, nor does he depart from the Way in success”, which leads him
to conclude that “in obscurity a man makes perfect himself, but in prominence, he
makes perfect the whole Empire as well” (Mencius 7A9).
The upshot of this profound ambivalence towards political involvement against the
backdrop of dynastic rule was an incessant feud among Confucian intellectuals. Some
Shidafu chose to stay complicit in the ruler’s brutality while aspiring to piecemeal
reform and more audacious ones risked their life in acting on their conscience. Others
chose to completely retreat from political affairs, which contributed to breeding a
culture of reclusion that continued to plague Confucian orthodoxy. The rest came to
profess a slavish devotion to supreme power, voluntarily turning the mark of the ruler.
And let’s not forget that many sycophants of the ruler were the beneficiaries of the civil
examination system which the meritocrats boast about (Bell 2006, 153-154; Xu 1985,
56). One way out of this conundrum, which is at odds with the spirit of Confucianism,
is readily proffered by leadership democracy, which, as a democratic institution,
regulates political struggles within legitimate boundaries and keeps on board political
opponents of all sides. A conscientious Confucian no longer needs to plunge into an
impossible mission of reconciling their deeply cherished values with serving a ruthless
monarch; rather, absent an autocratic ruler at the center, she can put herself forward as
a democratic leader by directly appealing to the public. The traditional worry of
usurpation can be dissipated by the peaceful and legitimate transfer of power. In case
she fails to secure power, the subsequent situation is no longer a black-and-white choice
between serving those for whom she holds contempt and withdrawal from politics, but
a dignified role as an opposition politician in parliament or as a vocal critic of the
government in civil society without the fear of persecution.
Another trouble closely related to Confucians’ political involvement is brutal
factional strife (dang-zheng/dangjaeng 黨爭 in Chinese and Korean, also sahwa 士禍
in Korean) recurrent in pan-Confucian societies, which can also be creatively, if not
entirely, addressed in CLD where regularized competition placates ideational disputes
and keeps violence at bay. Whether it is Song and Ming dynasties in China when
Confucian doctrines held sway, or the Chosun dynasty in Korea which enshrined
Confucianism wholesale as guiding court philosophy, factional conflicts usually went
amuck with scholar-officials of different strands within the Confucian tradition fighting
for political dominance (cf. Levine 2008; Lee 2007). Ideological differences easily
escalated into full-scale power confrontations, which usually ended up with bloodshed
and ferocious persecution. A winner often emerged not only as a victor of power
struggles but as someone entitled to the legitimate monopoly on interpreting the true
Way. This, however, is in stark contrast to the anti-factional attitudes held by the
Confucian masters. Although we find in the classic texts Mencius and Xun Zi resigned
to acrimonious exchanges with heretics over the interpretation of the Way, Confucian
ethical teachings are, at best, averse to verbal and factional disputes. Says Confucius,
“what the gentleman seeks, he seeks within himself; what the small man seeks, he seeks
in others,” and also “the gentleman is conscious of his own superiority without being
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contentious and comes together with other gentlemen without forming cliques”
(Analects 15.20, 15.20). Mencius was reluctant to engage in arguments though he found
himself compelled to argue (Mencius 3B9). While Xun Zi exhorted the nobleman to
embrace debates, he nevertheless posited that “(a nobleman) engages in argumentation,
but not to the point of causing a quarrel; he is critical, but not to the point of provoking
others” (Xun-Zi, “Bu-Gou”). Xun Zi further derided the human pursuit of dominance
(zheng 爭) as arising out of a bad penchant for satiating natural needs and wants (XunZi, “Li-Lun,” “Wang-Zhi”). Overall, Confucian ethical cultivation is motivated by a
harmonious unity between body and world and constrained by ritual propriety, or
simply put, the bonds of “civility” (Angle 2012, 91-110; Chan 2013, 90-91).
In CLD, in contrast, different vocations for Confucian beliefs can be accommodated
with no need to obliterate one group for another to triumph, which invites three
modifications of the traditional role played by Confucian intellectuals thereby restoring
Confucian harmony in politics. First, Schumpeterian competition ensures that diverse
Confucian voices can be put on an equal footing striving for the democratic mandate.
Confucian intellectuals, recast as Confucian politicians and constrained by democratic
mechanisms, can now bring themselves forward to competition rather than repression.
In other words, the extent to which the electorate give effect to their confessed norms
and values presides over, and mediates between, various Confucian groups or “parties”.
Second, the Confucian nobleman is no longer obliged to fight a solidary battle against
the corrupted currents of politics, which is doomed to failure and contradiction. Instead,
they can, as protagonists in leadership democracy, form, and coordinate through,
political parties which resemble the parties of principles as defined by Burke (1999),
or what Weber (1994, 193) calls the parties of a particular Weltanschauung. The
flexibility and pragmatism built into Confucian ethics would render Confucian parties
less uncompromising than they appear, but it is crucial, for them to stay as Confucian,
that Confucians act on their understandings of the Way rather than on a hotchpotch of
tactics lacking disciplines. Last but not least, Confucian noblemen need, in political
terms, seriously to take on the petty person (xiao-ren, 小人), the antipode of dignity
and noblesse embodied in the junzi. Physical extirpation is left out of the question;
instead, conscientious Confucians need to either win them over by persuasion or defeat
them in elections. In short, just as archery offers a condition where “the way (noblemen)
contend is gentlemanly” (Analects 3.7; Behuniak Jr 2010), leadership democracy
provides a venue for Confucians to win the battle in a civil manner and even if they fail
to win, there is institutionally protected public space where they can repose and perform
other civil duties in preparation for the next fray.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper started out by a discussion of the interpretative method. I argued that
Confucian plebeian and elitist values are embodied in a particular, elitist type of
democracy which I call Confucian leadership democracy. I have also gone to great
lengths to explain why it is appropriate to alter some specific texts in order to preserve
the spirit of classic Confucianism (e.g., popular approval, leadership, and harmony). In
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this way, I have gone a step further than New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan, Xu
Fuguan and Tu Weiming in specifying what kind of democracy Confucian thought
lends support to.
It should also be pointed out that not all types of leadership democracy are
Confucian insofar as classic Confucian thought is the sufficient, though not necessary,
condition of leadership democracy. Indeed, the family of leadership democracy can
come with liberal, republican and Confucian variants (Posner 2005; Shapiro 2009).
What then renders leadership democracy distinctively Confucian? In order to procure
the Confucian attribute of leadership democracy, we also need Confucian habits and
mores as the social ethos for citizens and the training mechanisms for leaders soaked
in Confucian classics, rituals and norms, which are subject to a complex interplay with
the institution of leadership democracy. Nevertheless, this article has fulfilled its
moderate mission if the reader decides to open up to the possibility that leadership
democracy is not antithetical to, but constitutive of, the spirit of classic Confucianism.
Speaking of this spirit may sometimes invite cynicism (Jenco 2017), but it is critical
for Confucian societies in attending to the modernity issue beyond the East-West
dichotomy. In East Asia today, especially China, there still exists a mindset of the
antithesis between the traditional way of life which gives shape to one’s own identity,
and the way of life imported from the West. This almost intransigent view takes hold
regardless of what one makes of this dichotomy in normative thinking. In stark contrast,
the first generations of Confucian scholars following the first Opium War (1839-1842)
including Xu Jiyu and Guo Songtao extolled the virtue of Western (both British and
American) democratic institutions as a resurrection of the Sage-King era and therefore
the culmination of the Confucian spirit. Their pioneering efforts to understand the
rhythm of cross-cultural connections preceded the later turn to the doctrine of “Chinese
learning as substance, Western learning for application” embraced during the SelfStrengthening Movement (1861-1895). This article shows that ideational connectivity
is porous and dynamic, which may help us better understand what it really means when
politicians and various interlocutors today speak of preserving the tradition and what
is lost and preserved in the so-called process of Westernization.
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